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Cities, Systems and Structures
An ontological approach to urban studies
Rodrigo Nicolau Almeida
 
1. Introduction
1 There is a set of questions with which any analysis about space, urban life, as well as
social  and  cultural  phenomena  taking  place  in  these  contexts,  has  to  face  even  if
implicitly: what do we define as a city, a culture, an urban space, an agent or a public
space? These questions  are  what  we can call  ontological  concerns,  that  is,  questions
regarding what can be said to exist in urban contexts, – including the concept of the
urban qua urban, or “urban in itself” – what properties they can be said to possess, etc.
Such suppositions can be found in urban research practice,  although often implicitly
(Zukin, 2011), despite their relevance in defining what entities are thought to belong to
an urban analysis, what methods should be used, and what impacts can be expected from
research.
2 In  parallel,  if  not  as  a  consequence  of  this,  in  urban studies  the  entities  postulated
between disciplines often lack cohesion, taking several meanings according to the specific
discipline.  Such  consistency  of  use  is  something needed  so  that  common  sense  and
intuitive notions such as “agent” or “culture” can be made into operational concepts,
easily understood within the field, and coherently mobilised. More so, the specific ways in
which such entities as agents or culture are given ontological substance – recognising
how  agents  can  be  embodied,  emotional,  rational  and  creative  agents  rather  than
fulfilling  the  axioms  of  Von  Neumann-Morgenstern,  for  instance  –  pose  important
questions to the development of  a  reflexive science that  recognises its  own imposed
limitations and seeks to capture how social reality truly is.
3 All such definitions – what the urban is, what entities we assume underlie that definition,
how best to study it, what methods to use – constitute a necessary starting point in the
practice  of  urban  research:  without  them we  cannot  do  research.  However,  explicit
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debates on these questions are lacking. The purpose of this paper is to try to open up a
debate on these two topics:
1. What is “the urban”?
2. What kind of entities, and what kinds of behaviours, generate “urban contexts”?
4 We seek to address such questions by first looking at the ways in which these ontological
questions  have  been  addressed  in  the  field  of  urban  studies.  We  defend  that  three
interconnected perspectives exist  on the substance of  “the urban” and argue for the
ontological primacy of emergent patterns of actions and relations by entities – analysed
as systems – in defining it. We then turn to the underlying entities present in such a
systemic ontology, outlining the metaphysical compromises made in that process and
arguing for explicitly assuming the complexity of agents, groups and objects through a
semiotic,  phenomenological  and  interdisciplinary  lens.  Finally  we  turn  to  the
epistemological  and  methodological  consequences  of  such  a  systemic  perspective,
drawing  some  implications  of  systems  theory,  semiotics  and  phenomenology  to  the
inquiries of urban research, before drawing some final remarks.
 
2. An Ontology of Urban Studies
2.1 The Ontological Urban Question
5 As Zukin (2011) points out, in reference to Castells (Castells, 1983), the concerns over the
ontological status of urbanity in general are not felt upon reading most works in urban
studies: whilst various ontological assumptions are mobilised, and certain aspects of ‘the
social’  are  considered  crucial  for  defining  the  urban,  these  debates  are  often  made
without direct reference to the status of such questions. The critique is quite incisive,
even if limited to the scope of urban sociology – although, whilst in other disciplines such
a concern has been at times made more explicitly (Lynch, 1960; Scott, 2008), it is anything
but the norm. 
6 Looking at  the  history  of  urban studies,  we find the  question “What  is  the  urban?”
(implicitly) present in many longstanding academic debates, with sociology being a prime
example:  from  the  succession  of  ideas  about  urban  space  as  a  system  of  economic
production, as in Marx, to its status being that of a threat to social community, as in
Durkheim and especially Tönnies, to urbanism as a way of life as stated by Wirth (1938),
to the urban as a habitat passible of ecological analysis (Park and Burgess, 1925), to the
urban as opposed to the productive and cultural patterns of the “rural”, as in Sorokin
(Nikulin and Trotsuk, 2018), the urban as another stage for the operation of the capitalist
system (Castells, 1983), or the urban as the producer and product of cognitive-cultural
economic shifts (Scott, 2008). In all of these works, the substance of the urban tends to be
posed in cautious terms. Always the questions that surround it are: can such defining
factors  be  known  from  any  specific  analysis  of  a  phenomenon,  or  multiple  such
phenomena? Can such a question even be legitimately asked?
7 All the same, these works mobilise sets of concepts to distinguish and specify certain
areas of study, defining them in light of specific disciplines, and opting to give greater
emphasis to certain entities than others within the urban – which we could call, to use
Heidegger’s terminology, “ontical questions”. However, since multiple disciplines find the
same objects, attribute them with the same names, yet focus on different aspects, the way
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each ontic hierarchy is  organised is  often widely different:  areas like architecture or
geography  will  consider  the  role  of  the  environment,  both  built  and  natural,  as  a
determinant factor, sociology, anthropology and economy will privilege the motives and
intentions of  agents (for instance,  the demand side explanations of  gentrification) or
alternatively  the  role  of  social  structures  that  command  action  from  the  agents,
generating a certain level of complexity of family ties, a dynamics of housing, or another
such pattern recognised as relevant.  This is a gross simplification, but one that finds
echoes in works such as those of Nigel Thrift (1996) in geography, John Urry (2002) in the
studies of culture and heritage, David Clarke (1997, 2010) in economic sociology or Bill
Hillier (1984) in architecture. We have thus two core problems in the study of urban life:
the lack of a commonly held notion of what “the urban” is, and a lack of synthesis in the
entities postulated to explain specific phenomena that occur in ‘urban contexts’. Should
the latter surprise us given the former?
8 From our understanding of the field of urban studies, we propose that views on “the
urban” can simplistically be characterised in three, interconnected, types of perspectives.
The first, which we might call the reductionist perspective, characterises “the urban” as a
mere family resemblance concept, without any more ontological substance than its use,
rendering the analysis of urban studies no different from any other analysis in the social
sciences, having merely a set of apparently different phenomena that can be reduced to
other, better understood forms. In short – the urban is nothing if not the social dressed in
specific structures of discourse. This is the position that Castells takes in his “The Urban
Question” (Castells, 1977), albeit moderated and somewhat influenced by the other two. 
9 By  posing  urbanity  as a  form  of  political,  ideological  and  scientific  construction,  it
simultaneously recognises that new forms of phenomena may appear in such contexts,
but  that  such  phenomena  are  ultimately  reducible  to  questions  of  economic
determination and class struggle. Such a position has its appeal in simplicity – it casts the
entire ontological question out of the window – but bears with it the cost of having to
systematically explain how the phenomena which have emerged in “urban contexts” can
be  intrinsically  tied  to  relations  of  power,  ideology,  or  another  external  basis  for
reduction. Moreover, by chasing the ontological question onto a new level, it forces us to
follow it  towards those domains of  knowledge – such as Marxist  theory – where the
question would have to once again be posed with “the social” in its place. 
10 The second perspective, which we might call the phenomenalist conception of the urban,
is one that equates “the urban” with a phenomenal experience, hinged on materiality,
sensation, and drawing heavily from the (post-) phenomenological tradition. This can in
part be seen in Simmel’s (2002) classical text on the metropolis, where the author sees the
metropolis as inducing a certain emotional state which in turn generates a set of social
effects. Rather than reducing the urban to the social, this perspective sees the urban as
inherently generating in human individuals (as presumably in other entities) a set of
phenomenal experiences and engagements with ‘objects’ that are what urbanity means. A
similar perspective is exposed by certain authors associated with some forms of object
oriented ontology – Jane Bennett’s work on the Political Ecology of Things (Bennett, 2010)
exposing in an accurate sense how the “assemblages” produced by our existence in the
midst  of  things  generates  a  specific  form which is  ontologically  relevant,  and which
impacts our engagement, or William Connolly’s (2010) discussion of how we engage in
certain “force fields” that shape our perception. The takeaway is simple: the urban is
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essentially borne out of the interrelations of certain actants, and is, like everything else,
subject to becoming and transformation (Connolly, 2010).
11 Such a perspective, in the extreme, would radically reject the former: rather than a vaster
entity determining the behaviour of the urban, it places the character of the urban in the
“agents” and “objects” themselves,  with relations which are eminently dependent on
them. But such a perspective, in taking on such a focus, makes the study of the urban a
volatile  endeavour,  with  an  added  risk  of  a  highly  nominalistic  and  atomised
epistemology that rejects patterned phenomena entirely.
12 The third and final perspective is a variation of what we have previously discussed: the
characterisation of the urban through one specific set of ontical entities, which might be
called an ontical-emergentist  perspective.  In  the limit,  it  defines  the urban as  being
reducible  to  the  specific  patterns  which  those  entities  otherwise  specified  generate
through their relations – the urban is the set of emergent behaviours caused by these
entities. In its strongest form such a perspective could take on a Humean stance (Lewis
1994), with similarities, although only in form, to the (ontic) structural realism of the
physical sciences (French, 2014; Worrall, 1989): all there is for our scientific purposes is
an analytical structure generated by entities which may or may not really exist as we
conceive them, and which guarantees the ontological consistency of our world. Such a
perspective has the advantage of being closest to the intuitive practice of most urban
scholars, but in turn is subject to criticism from the other two: there is no guarantee that
the patterns out of which the analyst casts a system are not mere epiphenomena of a
more foundational concept, being shaped by ideology; and in rejecting the phenomenal
character  of  the  urban  in  favour  of  a  high-level  description,  it  casts  a  series  of
metaphysical assumptions on objects, relations and agents that are rarely questioned,
and which deny the capacity of agents to reflect and act upon the very patterns they
generate.
13 These three perspectives coexist in the bulk of urban research practice: the first is mostly
found in Marxist theory as well as other forms of “grand-theory” (Castells, 1983; Lynch,
1994);  the  second appears  especially  in  areas  such  as  heritage  studies  (Haldrup  and
Bærenholdt, 2015; Waterton and Watson, 2015), some forms of anthropology (Low and
Lawrence-Zuniagais,  2003)  and  studies  of  geography  and  psychology  that  tackle  the
generation of place-identity (Goodman, Goodman, and Redcliff, 2010; Proshansky, Fabian,
and Kaminoff,  1983;  Urry,  1995);  whilst  the third is  found in sociology (Sassen,  1991;
Zukin, 1995), economics (Scott, 2012), geography (Portugali, 2011) in various ways that go
far beyond the scope of this article.
14 What this entails is that the very reflection on ontological questions remains an open
question, with numerous fields yet to explore. Nonetheless, we are particularly inclined
to defend one particular version of the third ontological perspective, which seems to us to
be better suited for the practice of an urban research that carries scientific and political
ambitions.
 
2.2 Urban Reflexive Systems
15 We propose that a way forward can be thought out by mobilising some of the ideas of all
three  former  ontological  perspectives,  and  tying  them  to  the  calls  for  a
“complexification” of social research in general (Urry, 2005) as well as urban research in
particular (Portugali, 2011), and to the expansion of complex systems theory (Morris et
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al.,  2014).  Whilst  systems “theory”  is  often referred to  as  a  “theory”,  it  is  first  and
foremost a framework through which to think the interrelations of entities, and to bring
into emphasis the emergent patterns that ensue. Crucially, such an approach requires
that we admit the existence of contexts which are conventionalised as “urban” – the
“urban contexts” we have alluded to, and which are socially taken to be as such1; and it
also  implies  that  no  single  system  can  account  for  the  urban,  with  systems  being
differentiated according to the types of entities and relations they contain – economic,
cultural, aesthetic, emotional, legal, amongst others – a point which deserves elaboration,
and to which we will return in the next section. From this perspective, the urban is an
entity that emerges out of the interrelations of patterns of ‘lower-level’ entities.
16 Such a framework can be found in areas such as urban ecology (Fischer-Kowalski and
Hüttler 1999) and some strands of architecture (Hillier and Juliette 1984), as well as urban
movement and dynamics (Portugali, 2011). It seems however to be lacking in contexts of
urban cultural studies, studies of meaning or of social ties – a case to which we will allude
throughout the text, to showcase the potential for systems to unite urban research. The
goal of such an ontological framework is to reduce the complexity of social phenomena to
a set of entities which relate to which other, which, in analytical terms, can be said to
compose a “system” out of  habitual  relations,  with specific ‘dynamics’  which may be
oriented towards one or another end and measured as such. It also bears an association to
certain  evolutionary  perspectives  (Mesoudi,  2016;  Steward,  1972),  as  well  as  to  the
Parsonian tradition of cybernetics,  which carry with them the Darwinian concepts of
adaptation, selection, drift and transmission as well as notions of function, optimisation
and feedback – concepts which although useful to represent some social phenomena have
to be used with caution to avoid falling into forms of conservatism (Buchanan and Powell,
2015; Mills, 1976) or of grand explanation without empirical ground (Mills, 1976).
17 An immediate criticism which can be made is that such an approach seems to again throw
the  ontological  burden  of  its  own explanation  into  another  concept.  Indeed,  such  a
criticism could continue by noting that in reducing the urban to a set of patterns we are
forgoing the entire set of engagements which individuals have and which mark the very
way in which urban contexts are experienced. Such a line of criticism would perhaps
accuse  us  that  this  functionalises  society,  doing  away  with  the  experiential  and
phenomenal  nature  of  engaging  in  urbanity.  However,  two arguments  can be  levied
against  it:  one  the  one  hand, we  would  note  that  the  sensations  generated,  and
engagements made by individuals, are not necessarily outside the scope of a systemic
ontology,  as  we  would  say  that  those  arrangements  which  are  born  of  phenomenal
experience will themselves be systems, whether on a purely psychological basis (how a
given being experiences its surroundings) or as systems of shared experience.
18 Moreover the work of  second-order cybernetics  (Pask and Foerster,  1960),  as  well  as
complex systems theory (Mesoudi 2016; Morris et al. 2014), show us that more complexity
is allowed into the systems than mere mechanistic representations, with the concept of a
reflexive system taking on the capacity to engage with its own action, to model its own
behaviour, and to trace its own path.
19 What this amounts to is first of all a conception of the urban as a set of patterns, analysed
as systems – but can this be said to answer what the urban as urban is? This we would
argue is not a question that should be answered a priori, but rather that towards which
the study of urban research points to: a description of what kinds of patterns exist in the
urban that do not exist elsewhere, and which clearly demarks it from other contexts.
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20 Furthermore, such a perspective seems to rescue the other two, in different forms: rather
than take the experience and phenomenal conception of the urban as having ontological
priority, such a perspective can and should be mobilised in refining what entities we
consider  to  have  ontical  substance;  and  the  critical  reductionist  thesis,  if  properly
situated in a context of emergentism, can imply that the urban generates impacts and is
recipient  to  consequences  of  higher  patterns,  generated  by  the  very  systems  which
constitute  the  urban  –  generating  in  the  process  phenomena  related  to  states,
international politics and questions such as gender or race.
 
3. A Systemics of the Urban
21 With this framework in mind – which we hope to develop further in future work – we are
still left with the task of defining what sort of entities exist and what their relations are.
Such a  task  involves  two key points:  on the  one hand it  seeks  to  propose  a  shared
language with which to model the patterns and to construct working systems; on the
other  hand,  it  invites  us  to  pay  close  attention to  the  ontological  and metaphysical
compromises  made in that  course,  and to note what  analytical  consequences  can be
drawn from such compromises. Having these entities and the restrictions or suppositions
made  of  them  clearly  outlined  seems  to  us  the  best  path  towards  constructing  an
analytically solid and politically well-defined area of studies, following in line with the
concerns  of  analytical  sociology  (Edling  and  Rydgren,  2014;  Hedström and Bearman,
2009),  amongst  other  similar  calls  in  social  theory  and  philosophy  for  middle-range
theories borne out of common ontological frameworks (Byrne, 1998; Elster, 1989).
22 In discussions of social systems, we are intuitively brought to the notion of “agent” – an
entity, often human in nature, that is able to execute a certain action, which is goal-
oriented, intentional in both a psychological and action-theoretical sense, and justified in
doing so (Wilson and Shpall  2016) – what is often summarily captured in the idea of
“rational agent”, and captured in axioms such as Von Neumann Morgenstern (Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944).
23 However, as Jane Bennett (2010) notes, what defines the agent is, in metaphysics, far from
settled – agent is often considered as opposite to “object”, in a duality where the first has
a generative, causal and effective power, capable of directing intentional action, whilst
the second lacks one or more of these characteristics. As the same author points out, the
specific point of cleavage is never clearly defined in an unproblematic way. A similar
problem can be seen in the distinction between agent and “structure” (Giddens, 1984):
whether to define agents as capable of intentional social action by themselves, capable of
exacting social transformation in a context of structural constraint that force them to
reproduction of social processes, or whether this constrictive force is what is responsible
for these transformations, has been a core discussion in sociology from its inception. 
24 Both approaches have often been charged with reductionism (agents are instances of
structures/objects;  structures/objects  are  instances  of  agents),  and  both  have  faced
attempts at synthesis, such as the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 1986) about the habitus,
Giddens “double structuration” (1984), and in philosophy, the work of Object-Oriented
Ontologists (Harman, 2007), with varying degrees of success. To speak of agent, we can –
not without its problems – assume a social action to be an effect that can be recognised as
having an effect in the social world, in that sense putting it on a similar basis than the
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Luhmannian  tradition  of  “information”  (Luhmann,  1982).  However,  such  recognition
need not be universal: since those very social worlds are not transparent, and require a
way of access that is often mediated by cognitive entities, we must be careful in speaking
of patterns generated by those actions (as we will discuss below), since it requires that we
admit that our analytical entities have a representation in the social world, and that we
can access them unproblematically. When such a presupposition cannot be met, we can
only hope to hint at vague patterns in social reality. Moreover, this implies that we are
not  compromised  to  any  form  of  agency  being  exclusively  human,  admitting,  with
authors such as Latour (2005), that other entities can have forms of agency.
25 We would want,  in order to better  appeal  to intuition and to our present  analytical
models, to take action as the basis of such agents. We can in that sense follow the line of
Parsons (Parsons, 1937), and take the crucial element of a social system to be this action –
we are nonetheless still in trouble. As noted by Habermas (Habermas, 1984), assuming
agents produce these actions through the intentional and rationalistic model above can
lead to a vicious circle if left at that: how should then agents engage in a context where
their  action  depends  on  the  actions  of  others,  often  called  the  problem  of  double
contingency?
26 We can think of a way to still take the action of agents as the core of the system, and not
fall into this problem, by simply complexifying what we take to be the agent. Drawing
from  the  phenomenalist  ontological  position,  we  can  assume  the  human  agent  (to
distinguish him from other “actants” in the Latourian sense) to metaphysically be the
entity that recognises its existence and engages with the world through a sensorial body,
that distinguishes himself  from objects in its capacity to manipulate them (Bourdieu,
1984; Merleau-Ponty, 2012). We likewise assume the human agent, in social terms, to be
the imbricated entity which acts upon a certain structure with an illusion of certainty
(Bourdieu,  1984),  a  certain  cognitive  framework,  a  sociological  background  which
constrains  his  capacity  for  action  whilst  giving  him  margins  of  creativity.  Such  a
discussion  can  lead  us  only  so  far  if  we  maintain  a  distance  from other  specialised
sciences:  we can,  without  loss  of  generality,  take concepts  from cognitive and social
psychology, economics and even biology to attempt to ground such a notion of agent,
which we hope to be able to develop further in future work.
27 What this amounts to, is saying that agents have a certain intention in their action, and
that they have specific causes for those actions. Such assumptions are what we can call
Principles of Action, and they permeate social theory: ‘Individuals act upon situations
based on towards maximizing their wellbeing’, which implies, in some of its forms, almost
perfect  information (Becker,  1976),  or  ‘Individuals  act  based on their  social  role’,  as
implied by Durkheimian structuralism, are some of those assumptions. We can speak of
the “strength” of such an assumption as the measure to which it can prove certain results
and entail certain analytical conclusions – stronger assumptions normally provide more
information but carry strong ontological restrictions. Different ontological arrangements
will impose such restrictions on the basis of what they attempt to prove, but drawing
from  a  phenomenological  perspective,  they  should  be  well-informed  of  their
consequences:  if  we assume that  agents  cognitively  and rationalistically  engage with
objects in all of their relations to them – denying that objects are imbued with meaning in
a social world, and are always deformed in how agents engage with them (Harman, 2002;
Heidegger,  1962)  –  we  will  be  constructing  a  model  with  dubious  applicability  in
epistemological and methodological terms.
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28 With these implications in mind, and having in mind the need to provide a general frame
of action which both accurately captures behaviour and can have further elaboration in
contexts such as cultural systems, we can draw from American Pragmatism and symbolic
interactionism, the following as a principle:
29 First Principle: Individuals act upon things based on the meaning that they attribute to
them (Blumer, 1969)
30 A clear definition of meaning is then forthcoming: following the pragmatic line exposed
by the symbolic interactionists (Blumer, 1969; Mead, 1934), and especially of semioticians
such as Charles Sanders Peirce, we can define meaning as a composite structure: it is a
given referent which, in a social world, we take to be represented by a sign, which is the
phenomenological projection of the entity, and is found through a chain of interpretation
(Peirce, 1958), where a set of interpretants, themselves other signs, are mobilised. Those
very referents can serve as the basis of urban analysis: taking individuals to be situated in
a world with socially constructed meaning which, nonetheless, has to be recognised on an
individual basis, we can take agents to be recognising such aspects as the (ordinal) value
of an object or the belonging of an element to a category when they act within relevant
systems. 
31 From this definition we can sketch a justification for the intuitive notion of the difference
of systems such as the economic, social or cultural: systems are distinct based on the
kinds of actions we identify with them2 – a purchase or exchange lying in an economic
system and a communication of appreciation lying in a cultural one – but also based on
the underlying interpretations, such that the same kind of action can be differentiated
according to what grounds it.
32 Having laid the basis of systems, and having a general ontological framework of an agent,
we need in a social world to talk of different kinds of agents. To do so we need to also
bring in agent properties, that admit of various attributes (an attribute being the “value”
that a certain property assumes in the individual). These can have physical or biological
(age or sex),  sociological  (gender) or otherwise specified basis (such as liking to play
football on Tuesdays when it rains in the town of Sines). These are not fundamental facts
of agents, but rather contingencies which gain sense by relation to a given society: the
“difference” that  generates  such properties  only exists  as  the product  of  agents  and
structures in interaction (Luhmann, 1982),  which lends to the common interpretation
that a property is an instance of a relation (Peirce, 1958), as is often mentioned in social
network analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; White, 1963). In a way, we can see that
those properties become then the result of the specific meaning that individuals attribute
to other individuals,  with the referents being categories,  and the interpretants being
those characteristics that are most strongly associated with them.
33 In urban contexts we ought also to define “objects” and “structures”. We can speak of a
territory as the perceived and outlined space where entities not built or incorporated by
humans exist, and which is subdivided into “territorial units” by geographical, physical
and cognitive criteria; non-human built entities defined as objects, which in the urban
context  are  mostly  buildings;  and  the  emergent  structures  which  derive  from  the
interaction between agents and other entities (including other agents), within a given set
of actions and normally set on a given intention of action, where such intention can be
constructed.  These structures are in fact  the basic building blocks of  any analysis:  a
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group, a territory, an institution, public space or commodities are in all cases structures
necessary to talk of urban social worlds.
34 For us to be able to proceed we must also make use of a primitive notion: the idea of set.
This can be taken as abstract ontological categories, like relations, and as such they exist
as building blocks of analysis, denoting a specific relationship: sets denote belonging to
themselves based on a predicate3, and when they possess a membership function they can
have fuzzy degrees of belonging. These forms are crucial in many conceptual definitions
and modelling efforts:  they follow the arguments of Charles Ragin (2000),  of how the
fuzzy nature of social  sciences should entail  an acceptance of such diffuse forms, for
instance in attributing indexes of certainty to constructs, as is the case of Cronbach’s
Alpha and similar tests for quantitative analysis, but which seldom if ever are seen in
qualitative analysis with a comparative framework (Smithson and Verkuilen, 2006). For
instance, when we talk of the elements of a given culture, it becomes conceptually more
accessible to imagine such a process as a diffuse set of belongings, driven by individuals
who place them within a set of concepts according to their apparent satisfaction of a
predicate to a certain extent, rather than defining in a clear-cut way what does belong to
the given culture.
35 We can then define here a class of structures composed of the previous elements, which
we  can  call  a  social  group:  an  entity,  abstractly  represented  by  a  set,  composed  of
individuals who share a given set of attributes that define it. The intuitive reasoning on
social groups would put them as “crisp” entities,  that is,  admitting belonging only in
binary terms – one either is or is not part of the group. However, it is clear that certain
predicates are inherently diffuse: “liking crocodiles” is not the same kind of relational
property  as  “being  16  years  old”  –  the  second  relates  to  a  socially  accepted  and
reproduced notion of age which is taken as unproblematic, whilst the first has a much
wider  margin  of  doubt,  as  “liking  crocodiles”  can be  a  very  different  thing  for  two
individuals. Consequently, what happens in some social groups is the need to admit input
functions with values that vary in an interval – they are diffuse social groups.
36 Such notes obviously leave out many elements which are crucial for the construction of
any analytical framework: we can speak of a type of object defined as ‘commodity’ as that
which can be  acquired (which involves  the  relation of  property  and the  subsequent
exchange of it), of ‘common’ or ‘public’ goods when the property belongs to an organized
structure to which the individual belongs (such as a state or a collective), and so forth.
Public space can thus be defined as a common good which contains multiple objects
which are supposed to be used by individuals, and which is recognised collectively (and
often institutionally) as belonging to all agents. Heritage could be defined in such a hasty
manner, but we reserve it for a specific kind of definition: following the notes of Merleau-
Ponty (2012) or Gibson (1979), we assume that the engagement of individuals with objects
entails a given relation of modality,  that is,  a certain way the object presents to the
individual in the plausible interaction between the two, whether physical manipulation
as such, taken as a cognitive primitive, or socially mediated action (Ramstead, Veissiére,
and  Kirmayer,  2016).  As  such,  cultural  affordances  can  be  seen  as  modalities,  and
modalities are in practice how the individual perceives his engagement with the object.
“Heritage” could be seen as generating such form of modality, where the engagement is
based on the attribution of high cultural, social or emotional capital to an object (or other
entity), in such a way that it is, to a greater or lesser extent, desired to remain for future
use  by  individuals  –  to  be  preserved.  The  heritage  modality  would  thus  also  lead
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individuals  to  categorise  elements  in  the  appropriate  category  –  the  category  of
“Heritage”.
37 With all of this in place we can conceive that something like an urban economic system
consists of a series of relations established by individuals, and where the agent engages
objects through an economic modality, interpreting them according to their utility and
executing actions such as exchanging, buying and transferring goods; and analogously,
that a cultural system consists of a culturally restricted modality, interpreted according
to  the  belonging  to  such  a  culture,  and  with  actions  such  as  communication  and
attendance of cultural events. Such a cultural system can then be restricted to deal only
with certain social groups, and the way in which they demark their properties, as well as
bounded to a certain territory to produce an urban cultural system fit for research. With
some necessary developments, phenomena such as cultural gentrification (Zukin, 1995),
urban  subcultures  (Brake,  1980;  Muggleton  and  Weinzierl,  2003),  creativity  (Costa,
Vasconcelos, and Sugahara, 2011) amongst other phenomena could be brought together
under  such a  description.  Namely,  for  phenomena such as  heritage,  such a  systemic
discussion can bring to light the similarities of topics discussed there with other cultural
phenomena.
38 However, as we alluded in passing, all of these elements serve only as “building blocks”,
having epistemological and methodological consequences which need to be brought to
discussion –  especially  in  what  this  concerns  the  practice  of  urban research and its
political impacts.
 
4. Epistemological and Methodological Issues
39 Having these entities in place, and their inherent complexities in mind, it would be odd to
produce  an  analysis  which mobilised  them through simple  mechanisms  of  obtaining
theoretical  and  empirical  knowledge.  We  can  here  follow  some  implications  of  a
phenomenalist perspective of urban studies, without following it entirely, with the goal
of  trying  to  construct  explanations  about  urban patterns  based on the  way that  we
engage with the entities of our research: using, as far as possible, the representations of
the social world presented by the agents, despite the limitations inherent in adequately
accessing  those  representations,  and  checking  as  far  as  possible  the  scope  of  our
assertions over external entities with other analysts, so that biases can be detected and
incorporated.
40 However, there is the need to clarify what this means in practice: given that urban studies
have a normative as well as a positive compromise, how can we hope for urban research
to simultaneously engage the agents in their  complexity,  with their  conceptions and
understandings of reality, to produce a scientifically accurate representation, and also
have normative value for public  policy? If  that  is  possible,  what epistemological  and
methodological benefits can be reaped from such an ontology?
41 Following these lines of questioning, authors such as Alfred Schutz set out to describe
social reality as being composed of multiple “lifeworlds” (Schutz, 1967), which depend on
a temporal  horizon as well  as  a  local  context.  In similar fashion,  albeit  with a more
cognitive focus, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1964, 2012) founded the notion of modality and
claimed that the body serves as a fundamental entity in constructing understandings
about the realities we engage with,  bridging the understanding of the social  and the
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individual through the body, and giving social substance to many Heideggerian notions of
engagement  such  as  his  tool  analysis  and  his  ontological  categories  of  engagement
(Harman, 2002; 2009), to which we alluded in the previous section.
42 Both research programs bring us the notion of agent we previously outlined: if we admit
that  the  agent  engages  with  a  social  world  through  his  inhabiting  of  a  body  in  an
existential context, and a world already imbued with meaning, how can we seek to obtain
knowledge of the interpretations of these agents, and what can we guarantee comes from
it? Such a debate ties deeply with questions of the objectivity of research – whether
analysts can truly detach from their own lifeworlds in accessing interpretations and even
actions carried out by agents (Andersen, 2009; Beiser, 2011; Habermas, 1988) – as well as
with the epistemic status of said research, and its ultimate ambitions. 
43 The first question seems to us to have a solution by imposing a strong restriction on the
urban analyst as the social analyst in general, and can be generally formulated as such: 
44 Second Principle: Whenever the representation of a given analytical entity can be given
through its own understanding of the world, such an understanding should be selected,
and any analytical abstraction – such as the creation of typologies or aggregations – must
as far as possible be recognised by the agents themselves. 
45 However, such an epistemological principle can only be made universal at the cost of
reducing all research into a mere descriptive effort (Santos, 1988). In so far as the analyst
recognises in the agent a similar, and can empathise with his logics of action, even if
never perfectly map into his social world, such a principle can perhaps be relaxed by
allowing researchers to use alterity as a weak proxy for knowledge, taking care at length
in understanding how and when comparisons, generalisations and classifications can be
made,  and  working  productively  in  such  a  context  (Graeber,  2015).  However,  that
naturally  implies  greater  scrutiny  into  the  epistemological  choices  made in  analysis:
when a cultural  systems analyst decides to classify interpretants,  his work should be
possible to check and verify openly.
46 Having  such  a  position  naturally  inclines  us,  in  the  debate  between  positive  and
interpretative science, to a Weberian-Diltheyan verstehen (Dilthey, 1991; Weber, 1991),
which for instance in sociology played off Durkheim (Durkheim, 1998) and his “social
facts” against the types of Weber. However, analysing Weber’s arguments – such as the
fact that social reality always transcends the models we use to analyse them, requiring
that we look at the complexity of the field at hand, and criticizing the over-expansion of
scientific rules found – seems to allow the possibility of modelling phenomena that share
a given structure. That amounts to first interpreting social phenomena through a set of
ontological  assumptions,  and through them abstracting from the particulars  into the
principles  considered  at  hand.  The  generalisation  of  properties,  through  a  pattern
emergent  from  the  behaviour  of  the  entities,  gives  us  a  trade-off  in  generality  of
explanation and analytical precision (Epstein and Atxell, 1996), due to the plausible case
that social phenomena manifest nearly chaotic levels of emergence (Byrne, 1998; Urry,
2005), with minimal properties dramatically shifting the behaviour of the system over
time. But in doing so, it allows us to speak of rules and to consider the dynamics of the
system over time, whilst also reminding us of the inherent limitations of such a process.
Many other implications – such as the role of history in social theorising – also appear to
be reconcilable with the analysis  of  such patterns and should be aptly kept in mind
(Habermas, 1988; Kashim,a 2014; Mesoudi, 2016).
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47 Such debates also bring us to the question of the admission of ethical  orientation in
research. The implication of works such as Habermas’ (1988) tend to be that accepting
critical  theory  does  not  destroy  positive  science,  but  rather  exists  in  a  permanent
continuum with it – social science and applied fields such as urban studies more so, are
always critical  and always positive,  but importantly,  can never be adequately critical
without  being positive (that  would be a  merely moral  projection onto the field)  nor
adequately positive without being critical (that would be ignoring a large part of the
social phenomenon at hand). Crucially though, this hinges on recognising that the agents
which we analytically construct and about which we make epistemological assumptions
have themselves ethical charges which should be taken into account, and that they can
reflect  upon the very logics  of  impact  and planning that  relate to the patterns they
generate – putting reflexivity to good use, as is the practice of some forms of planning
(Fainstein, 2016).
48 Finally,  such  an  ontological  and  epistemological  admission  of  systems  and  levels  of
abstraction appears to us to open the way to the inclusion of new tools for modelling –
such as Agent Based Modelling, where the full strength of a clear set of entities can be
seen as the models take those same entities as part of their model, and intake principles
of action to guide their behaviour.  Despite having a long history (Epstein and Atxell,
1996),  and  numerous  applications  in  urban  studies  (Boavida-Portugal,  Ferreira,  and
Rocha, 2014; Bruch and Atwell, 2015; Morris et al., 2014; Portugali, 2011), the potential of
using such tools for modelling all types of systems – rather than only those that involve
assumptions of objective measurement – can open the way for more formal and accurate
models that can, with time and effort, hopefully be turned into tools to inform policy-
making by using ABM in conjunction with empirical data from the agents. In particular,
by  not  requiring  quantitative  inputs,  and  outputting  not  only  measures  but  also
qualitatively observable outputs,  such a tool seems particularly adequate for areas of
urban analysis that have little in the way of formal methods of representation of their
theories.
 
5. Concluding Notes
49 The transformation of urban and cultural contexts in recent years has renewed the need
for  intensive  urban  research  dedicated  to  outlining  social  problems  and  providing
empirical and theoretical insight for the development of policy and social action. Due to
its  dual  role in producing analysis  and normative assessment,  the field is  active and
hastily engaged with socio-institutional contexts, which may in part explain some of the
conceptual diffusion that tends to happen and which often leads to cross-disciplinary
(and sometimes intra-disciplinary) confusion.
50 By discussing the question “what is the urban?” we identified three general perspectives
which are present in urban studies – social reductionism, a form of phenomenalism and a
form of emergentism – which outline specific projects for the analysis of the urban and
carry different kinds of entities with them. By proposing a specific approach to the latter,
which takes multiple interconnected emergent patterns of action – analysed as systems –
as the core entity, we sought to propose a way of framing current urban research as
analysis of different systems, out of which the specific difference of the urban can be seen
to emerge.
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51 Consequently,  we  also  tried  to  show  how  such  a  construction  can  be  based  on  a
phenomenological,  social-theoretical,  semiotic  and  interdisciplinary  debate,  and  how
such an approach can bear  adequate  epistemological  ground to  construct  normative
assertions that take on the complexity of the agents as morally charged agents with a
capacity for social engagement, as well as their limitations, flaws and biases. We likewise
attempted to show the methodological paths made clearer through a clear ontological
perspective, namely the use of Agent Based Modelling as a tool for theory building and
testing.  It  is  our  belief  that  sufficient  development  of  these  tools  should  allow  the
production of policy modelling up to and including domains of culture or place-identity –
and it should be the practice of urban studies to attempt to make such experiments in
order to best go in line with the political needs of relevant stakeholders.
52 It is our understanding that the systemic perspective exposed in this paper can serve as a
promising avenue for bringing urban research under a common framework not only
internally,  but  also  in  relation  to  fields  such  as  engineering,  biology,  psychology,
international relations or macroeconomics, with which it finds itself more often in dialog
as a product of global-level changes. However, further discussion and research is needed
in all of these domains. Areas such as cultural and material heritage studies, given their
circumstantial positioning in urban contexts can likewise benefit from their discussion as
systems of shared meaning with given dynamics and specific patterns. Bridging these
areas can in that sense provide the field with greater social recognition – necessary in its
dealings with stakeholders – as well  as hopefully,  on a final basis,  provide a decisive
answer to what patterns effectively make “the urban”.
Zukin, S. (2011) “Is There An Urban Sociology? Questions on a Field and a Vision”, Sociologica (3):
1-18.
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NOTAS
1. A finer version of this semiotic assessment of what kinds of contexts, or things, qualify as
“urban”  could  and  should  be  given  by  inquiry  into  the  ways  in  which  they  are  socially
categorised as such.
2. It seems natural to assume that the same kinds of action belong to different systems; however,
the referents of such systems should, at least for analytical purposes, be taken as unique, to avoid
over-generalising the concepts.
3. This intuitive understanding of set is  deeply problematic in set theory and is often called
“comprehension without  restriction”  –  that  is,  understanding  that  the  set  is  defined  by  the
members which satisfy the given predicate, which lead easily to Russel’s Paradox. Whilst it is by
itself questionable that anything like that would happen analytically, it is likewise worthy of note
that in multi-value logic – fuzzy logic and fuzzy sets – like we are discussing here, the axiom of
comprehension is sufficient (Hájek and Haniková, 2003).
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RESUMOS
Ontological  issues  lie  at  the  heart  of  the  epistemological,  methodological  and  theoretical
discussions over the workings and operations of cities – however, as Castells and Zukin point out,
they often find themselves mired in the midst of the praxis of urban studies, for reasons not
entirely clear. In this work we attempt to trace a path through the ontology of urban studies,
attempting to show the reasons for this apparent omission, as well as showing a possible line of
convergence through the lens of systems theory, for a common ontology. We propose a set of
analytical classes drawn from the literature, drawn from the need to discuss social phenomena,
tracing some of the ontological compromises made in light of such entities. In line with that, we
argue  there  is  a  need  for  a  transparent  phenomenological  epistemology,  tracing  some
methodological  implications  of  such  processes.  We conclude  by  drawing  some scientific  and
practical implications of these debates for a more general discussion of ontology in urban studies
and research. 
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